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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant was charged with 3 Counts of unlawful distri-
bution for value of a controlled substance to an undercover 
agent on May 24 and June 3, 1985, in violation of Section 
58-37-8. (R 60-61) Addendum 1 
Dr. Erickson plead not guilty and also alleged the 
affirmative defense of Entrapment, Section 76-2-303. (R 11) 
Addendum 2. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On August 27, 1985 at the Evidentiary Hearing (R 282-
355) the court heard testimony regarding defendant's Motion to 
Suppress all physical evidence, Suppress all statements elici-
ted from defendant (R 16), and to Dismiss the case and action 
based on the defense of Entrapment, Sec. 76-2-303. (R 19) The 
court generally denied these Motions. See the Minute Entry 
(R 57-59) ; and Findings and Conclusions (R 64-66) Addendum 3 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider certain Findings and 
Conclusions and make new Findings and Conclusions (R 92-135) 
was denied. 
The case went to jury trial. (R 356-572) At the end 
of the State's case, the Motion for a Directed Verdict was 
denied. (R 517) At the end of the trial defendant was found 
guilty on all 3 Counts. (R 184-186) His Motion for a New Trial 
was denied. (R 214) His Motion to Arrest Judgment (R 197-206) 
was denied, and he was sentenced. (R 210-211) Addendum 4. 
Defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. The State did not meet its burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that entrapment did not occur. 
II. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion 
to suppress, motion to dismiss, motion for a directed verdict, 
motion to arrest judgment and set aside the three convictions 
and enter judgment of acquittal, and in sentencing defendant 
based upon illegal and tainted evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Erickson was born in 1936 and has been practicing 
dentistry since 19 71. During the 12-day period involved (May 
23-June 3, 1985), he had Dental Offices in Taylorsville, Salt 
Lake County, Utah. He is married and has children and grand-
children. Dr. Erickson had financial difficulties, and on May 
17, 1985 he filed his dental business in Bankruptcy. (R 532-
534; 331) 
Prior to June 3, 198 5, when Dr. Erickson was arrested, 
he had never been charged with any felony, 
had never been charged by the Dental Association, 
had never been charged or reprimanded by the Board of 
Regulations, (R 536) and 
had never been charged with selling any type of drugs 
(R 332). 
Metro Narcotics Undercover Agent Celeste Paquette had 
never seen Dr. Erickson prior to May 24, 1985. (R 298; 383) 
Under the assumed name of Kris Gordon, she visited his Offices 
in Taylorsville 8 times during May 24-June 3. 
The Officers testified that they had an informant (R 285; 
430-432), who told them that Dr. Erickson was overprescribing 
or distributing pharmeceutical drugs to patients illegally. 
Officer Paquette was asked, "Do you know anyone in the 
last 14-15 years that Dr. Erickson sold drugs to? * * * A. 
Other than myself, no." (R 4 26) 
Kris Gordon called Dr. Erickson's Dental Office on May 
23 requesting an appointment for a checkup. (R 286) 
At no time did Dr. Erickson ever call or try to reach her. 
On May 24, at about 10:30 a.m., she went to the Doctor's 
Office. (R 286; 357-359; 378) "Kris was acting pretty nervous 
and picking at her fingernails, just kind of jumping around" 
(R 520) . 
Officer Paquette testified that she had a conversation 
with the Doctor while in the dental chair, "I stated that I didn't 
have a problem with my teeth, that I just wanted to talk to the 
Doctor." (R 286; 359) * * * "I continued to talk to him and 
stated that I was—I had taken some speed in the past and that 
I was wondering if it was really as hazardous to your teeth or 
as detrimental as I had heard it would be. And again he stated 
that he would have to look at my teeth first. * * * He examined 
my teeth. * * * " (R 286; 359) 
Q. Is there some reason that you told him you didn't 
have any particular problems with your teeth? 
A. Yeah. I really didn't want any dental work done. 
I wanted to see if he would sell me drugs." (R 3 59-360) 
* * * 
Q. And you didn't need any dental work? 
A. That is correct. 
* * * 
A. My intention was to see if he would sell me narcotic 
drugs. (R 378) 
* * * 
Q. So your primary objective to go there was to buy 
contraband or controlled substance or Demerol or Morphine or 
anything you could? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. That was your primary objective, wasn't it? 
A. To buy a narcotic drug. 
A. To buy narcotics or any drug you could? It didn't 
make any difference what you were going to buy? Your mission 
was to buy drugs, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, it was. (R 298) Also see (R 398; 402; 422-23) 
* * * 
Q. And so your primary purpose there was to try to buy 
drugs from the Doctor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At any cost? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. At any price, any cost? 
A. Legally from my point of view to buy drugs, to make 
a case to buy drugs. (R. 381) (emphasis added) 
On May 24, at about 10:30 a.m., when Kris Gordon first 
visited the Dental Office, she testified that her roommate was 
with her and that, 
A. * * * She just came along to make it look good. * * * 
Q. She came along to make it look what? 
A. Look normal, just kind of prop. (R 302) 
* * * 
Agent Foster Mayo testified that, 
A. * * * She's not here to have her teeth cleaned or 
have any dental repair work. * * * 
Q. Is there a reason she would say something to that 
nature? 
A. Well, the scenario that we wanted to provide is was 
that she was an amphetamine addict and not looking for legitimate 
dental work. (emphasis added) 
Q. So the only reason shefd be at the Dental Office 
would be what? 
A. To obtain a prescription or drugs outside the realm 
of professional services rendered by a dentist. (R 4 50) 
• * * 
The receptionist testified that Kris, 
A. * * * was acting real jittery, and she had told us 
that she had taken a lot of speed and she was worried about the 
damage that it had done to her teeth. And she was picking at 
her fingers, and you know, she wouldn't relax her neck in the 
chair. And it seemed to me at that time that she was still 
taking drugs. (R 328) 
* * * 
A. * * * we thought that she was a junky and that he 
didnft want to have anything to do with her. (R 524-25) 
After Kris Gordon's dental examination on May 24, at 
about 10:30 a.m., she made payment to the receptionist, and 
then "she walked back to the lab room and started talking to 
Dr. Erickson," (R 324; 337; 338) 
* * * 
Officer Paquette testified, 
Q. Did you tell him about your taking speed? 
A. Yes. * * * He asked me how many I would be taking 
a day. I said probably 15. (R 384) 
* * * 
Q. When you were there for the first appointment, did 
you discuss any particular drug with the Doctor? 
A. The first visit? * * * I brought up the speed. 
(R 388) 
On May 24, Kris Gordon returned to the Dental Office 
about 5:30 p.m. and was told by the receptionist to come back 
about 7:00 p.m. (R 324-5; 525) Dr. Erickson had informed the 
receptionist to tell Kris Gordon to come back when he figured 
he would be gone. (R 339: 525) After the Office was closed 
and locked, about 6:00 p.m., and Dr. Erickson was at his motor-
cycle putting his helmet on to leave, Kris Gordon walked up. 
(R 527-28; 325) Dr. Erickson went back into the Office with 
Kris Gordon where there was a transfer to the Doctor of $60.00 
and he sold her 30 pills. (R 290; 305; 554) 
Officer Paquette testified that she would contact the 
Doctor on Friday, May 31 (R 305) and she returned to the Office 
about 5:00 p.m., but there were patients in the Office and she 
did not see the Doctor; so she returned to the Office about 
6:00 p.m. and at this visit with the Doctor, they discussed her 
purchasing controlled substances from the Doctor for $5,000.00. 
(R 305-6; 343; 544-45) 
Kris Gordon had an appointment on June 3 at 10:00 a.m. 
to get her teeth cleaned, but the receptionist had overbooked 
and she asked Kris Gordon to return at 2:00 p.m. (R 326; 371) 
She returned to the Office about 2:00 p.m. and Dr. Erickson 
cleaned her teeth and she paid the receptionist. (R 326-27) 
She testified that "he didn!t want to talk about it right then, 
but I should return at 6:00 p.m." (R 371) 
About 6:00 p.m. June 3, Kris Gordon returned to the 
Doctor's Office and the transaction took place, to-wit: she 
passed him an envelope, testifying that it contained $5,000.00 
and he passed to her pills and Demerol. (R 295; 317; 372-73; 547) 
After she gave her pre-arranged signals to the other Officers 
outside, about 8 other Officers entered the Dental Office with 
guns and arrested Dr. Erickson. (R 417-19; 547-48) The 
Officers took the envelope containing the alleged $5,000.00. 
(R 421; 547) 
When the Doctor asked and inquired of Kris Gordon if 
she was a "plant," she said no. (R 310; 350; 391; 540; 547) 
(emphasis added) 
During the 12-day period involved, May 23-June 3, 198 5, 
there was no arrest warrant or search warrant issued 
(R 311; 319), and 
there was no Utah State District Court Judge Order 
authorizing or approving interception of the conversations 
between Officer Paquette and Dr. Erickson in his Office (R 30 7; 
319), as provided by Section 77-23a-8. Addendum 6 
Officer Paquette was wired-taped with a transmitter on 
her person and her conversations with the Doctor in his Office 
were being monitored outside by other Officers (R 447), to wit: 
May 24 at about 5:00 p.m. (R 367-68; 377), May 24 at about 6:00 
p.m. (R 368; 377; 390-91), May 31 about 6:15 p.m. (R 306; 398), 
June 3 about 6:00 p.m. (R 312; 416). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ENTRAPMENT. The State failed to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that entrapment did not occur. The evidence proved 
that defendant was entrapped. The trial court failed to follow 
and apply the federal and state doctrine of entrapment—the 
objective test doctrine. 
The evidence was totally tainted by entrapment. Defen-
dant was found guilty and sentenced based upon illegal and 
tainted evidence. No crime would have been committed but for 
the insistence and persistence of the Officers. The criminal 
conduct charged against the defendant was the product of the 
creative activity of the Officers because of their initiative, 
persistence, instigation, enticement, persuasion, inducement 
and planning for the commission of a crime. Dr. Erickson was 
in financial trouble, in bankruptcy, and the serpent bequiled 
him and he did eat, Sorrells v. U.S., 77 L.Ed. 413, revfd. 57 
F.2d 973 (4th C.A. 1932) . 
The trial court also erred in failing to exclude the 
tainted electronic surveillance evidence. No Utah State District 
Court Judge issued an Order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of wire or oral communications between Dr. Erickson and 
Officer Paquette, Section 77-23a-8. Addendum 6 All electronic 
surveillance evidence should have been excluded. Section 77-23a-
7. Addendum 5 
There were no affidavits for search and seizure warrants 
and there were no search and seizure warrants at any time. Defen-
dants 4th Amendment and Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
rights were violated. Addendums 7 and 8. After the Officers 
had probable cause, a search and seizure warrant was required, 
Harris, Coolidge, Sanders, infra; Payton v. N.Y., 445 US 573. 
There was no hot pursuit and no exigent circumstances 
after Dr. Erickson was arrested on June 3, 1985. The control-
led substances that were received by Officer Paquette were 
tested and testified to in court by plaintiff's witnesses with-
out a search warrant having been issued. Defendant submits 
that "testing is a form of search," Lowry and Westlund, infra, 
and that a search warrant should have been issued prior to the 
testing of the controlled substances. There was no search 




THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT THE 
OFFICERS INTENDED TO AND DID ENTRAP 
DEFENDANT. 
The state had the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that en-
trapment did not occur. 
The evidence proved that defendant was entrapped. 
* * * "It was the government's burden to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped." * * * 
U.S. v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217, at 1220; U.S. v. Henry, 749 F.2d 
203; State v. Levsen (Iowa) 261 NW2d 471. 
The evidence is legion illuminating the entrapment of 
defendant. Any iota of evidence of entrapment is sufficient 
to find defendant not guilty. Evidence of entrapment is not 
weighed by the amount or quantity, or measured by degree. 
Dr. Erickson was law abiding and his hands were clean. 
He had never been "charged" or "reprimanded" (R 536). 
Defendant filed in Bankruptcy May 17, 1985 (R 331; 535). 
Six (6) days later on May 23, 1985, undercover Officer Paquette, 
using the fictitious name of Kris Gordon, called Dr. Erickson1s 
Dental Office for an appointment for May 24. She had never seen 
the Doctor before (R 298). In his Office she started the con-
versation off by talking about "speed" (R 3 79). (In Kourbelas, 
infra, agent "Nelson brought up the subject of selling marijuana," 
p. 1239.) She persisted in visiting his Office 8 times during 
the 11-day period (May 24-June 3). She testified that she did 
not "need" or "want any dental work done," (R 360; 378) and that 
her "mission" (R 298) and "only purpose" at the Doctor's Office 
was to try to buy drugs from him (R 402) and from her point of 
view, 
"to make a case to buy drugs" (R 381), (emphasis added), 
and that her 
"intention was to see if he would sell me narcotic 
drugs" (R 378). (emphasis added) 
The trial court erred in failing 
to follow and apply the federal 
and state doctrine of entrapment. 
This Court will interfere (1) if it appears that the 
trial court abused its discretion or misapplied principles of 
law
' Rohr v, Rohr (Utah 1985) 709 P.2d 382, and (2) reverse a 
jury conviction for insufficient evidence, State v. Miller, 
709 P.2d at 355. 
The evidence clearly or conclusively establishes en-
trapment . 
Utah adopted the objective test doctrine for deter-
mining whether a defendant has been entrapped, and the objec-
tive test looks primarily to police conduct, State v. Taylor, 
599 P.2d 496; State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404; State v. Cripps, 
692 P.2d 747. 
Officer Paquette visited and persisted 8 times at the 
Doctorfs Office. In State v. Kourbelas (Utah) 621 P.2d 1238, 
the agent renewed and contacted defendant at least 5 times "in 
attempting to purchase the marijuana,11 and that "there is no 
evidence that the defendant had previously possessed or dealt 
in the drug," and that it is "not a proper function of law en-
forcement officers, either themselves or by the use of under-
cover agents or decoys, to induce persons who otherwise would 
be law abiding into the commission of crime," p. 1240, and 
"there necessarily exists a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
offense committed was the product of the defendant's initiative 
and desire, or was induced by the persistent requests of Mr. 
Nelson"; and the defendant's conviction was reversed. (emphasi 
added) 
In Sprague, supra, Tauffer approached defendant at 
least 3 times- "The Offense was induced by the persistent 
requests by Tauffer, not by the initiative and desire of defen-
dant"; and the conviction was reversed. (emphasis added) 
The receptionist took Kris Gordon to the front office 
where payment was made for the services rendered, then Kris 
Gordon, "walked back to the lab room (15-18 feet) and started 
talking to Dr. Erickson." (R 324; 337; 344; 523) The Doctor 
testified, "She wanted me to write a prescription for dilaudid 
* * * a severe pain killer * * *" (R 338) but "I did not." 
She did not need or want dental work, she persisted in tempting 
Dr. Erickson to commit any crime. 
In State v. Soroushirn (Utah) 571 P.2d 1370, "there is 
nothing to suggest that the appellant would ever have dealt in 
marijuana except at the instance of and for the benefit of the 
officer," and the judgment was reversed and the case remanded 
with instructions to find the appellant not guilty, p. 1372. 
There is nothing here to suggest that Dr. Erickson would ever 
have dealt in controlled substances, except at the request, 
instance, persistence, inducement and temptation by Kris Gordon 
at his Office. If she had stayed away from him and his Office, 
there would have been no crime and charges. The Officers came 
up "with some plan" for Officer Paquette to lure and entice Dr. 
Erickson (R 285; 413; 432). 
"Entrapment is the seduction or improper inducement to 
commit a crime for the purpose of instituting a criminal prose-
cution, * * * " and "there is no evidence of any prior conduct 
of the defendant that would have shown predisposition. There 
is no evidence that he was engaging in criminal activity before 
he took the money from the decoy. * * * the decoy simply pro-
vided the opportunity to commit a crime to anyone who succumbed 
to the lure of the bait * * * The defendant's acts * * * 
demonstrate only that he succumbed to temptation." Oliver v. 
State (Nev. 1985) 703 P.2d 869, at 870. (Dr. Erickson was 
financially stressed and in bankruptcy and he was tempted with 
money by Kris Gordon.) As a matter of law, "Oliver was en-
trapped" and the conviction was reversed. * * * "We think the 
activities of the officers, however well intentioned, accomp-
lished an impermissible entrapment" * * * p. 8 70. (emphasis 
added) 
The leading federal case on entrapment appears to be 
Sorrells v. U.S, supra, the serpent beguiled me and I did eat. 
Martin, a revenue-prohibition agent visited Sorrells and sug-
gested that Sorrells sell him a half gallon of whiskey, but 
Sorrells replied that "he did not fool with whiskey." Martin 
pressed the point and one hour and several requests later, 
Sorrells produced the whiskey. Martin then made the arrest, 
which was the purpose of his visit. There was no evidence 
that the defendant had ever violated the liquor laws prior to 
the solicitation. * * * "It is clear that the evidence was 
sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which defen-
dant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, 
that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no 
previous disposition to commit it, but was an industrious, law-
abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise 
innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solici-
tation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the senti-
ment * * * (emphasis added). Such a gross abuse of authority 
given for the purpose of detecting and punishing crime, and 
not for the making of criminals, deserved the severest condem-
nation," p. 416. Upon the evidence produced, the defense of 
entrapment was available and the trial court was in error in 
holding that as a matter of law there was no entrapment, p. 4 22. 
In Sherman v. U.S., 2 L.Ed.2d 84 8, the Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to 
the District Court with instructions to dismiss the indictment 
on the grounds that the defense of entrapment was established 
as a matter of law and the criminal conduct charged against the 
defendant was the product of the creative activity of law en-
forcement officials. 
Here the evidence is undisputed that there was originally 
no intent on the part of defendant to violate the law, and (1) 
that the unlawful activity was induced by undercover Officer 
Paquette, (2) that the criminal design originated with the 
Officers, and was conceived in the mind of the officers, (3) 
that the defendant was by persuasion and inducement lured 
(tempted) into the commission of a criminal act by Officer 
Paquette. 
I n
 Taylor, supra, * * * "His conviction cannot stand 
for the reason the statute condemns the conduct of the state 
in inducing the crime, as a perversion of the proper standards 
of administration of criminal law," p. 504. Dr. Erickson was 
not predisposed to commit the crime prior to the visit by Kris 
Gordon and he was an innocent person, who would not have erred, 
except for the persuasion of the government's agent Paquette. 
He lawfully had the controlled substances in his office (R 342; 
* * * "using a Federal order form" R 537-38). 
* * * "Entrapment occurs when the criminal design origi-
nates with the officials of the government, and they implant in 
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the 
alleged offense and induce to commission in order that they may 
prosecute." * * * Sherman, supra. 
Kris Gordon did not need or want dental work and her 
primary mission and sole purpose and intent was to try to buy 
drugs from Dr. Erickson and make a case against him. 
Entrapment is a valid defense if the officers implant, 
manufacture, conceive, inspire, incite, devise or manipulate a 
person to commit a crime which he otherwise had no intention of 
doing. State v. McDonald (Ohio) 289 NE2d 583; People v. Bernal 
(Cal.) 345 P.2d 140; Lopez v. U.S., 10 L.Ed.2d 462. A line must 
be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap 
for the unwary criminal," Sherman, supra. 
Offers of profit grossly disproportionate to what is 
reasonably expected in the traffic of contraband should not be 
permitted when they would overwhelm the self-control of a normal 
person, Grossman v. State (Ala.) 457 P.2d 226. In People v. 
Isaacson, 406 NYS 2d 714, * * * "Even where a defense of entrap-
ment is not made out because of the predisposition of the defen-
dant to commit the crime, police misconduct may warrant dismis-
sal on due process grounds." * * * (emph. added) There is a 
need for courts to recognize and uphold principles of due 
process, U.S. v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531. In Isaacson, supra, the 
indictment was dismissed because the court found "the manu-
facture and creation of crime" by the officers; and police con-
duct warranted a dismissal on due process grounds. An accused 
may be acquitted on due process grounds where the government's 
involvement in the crime is outrageous and reprehensible, U.S. 
v. Russell, 36 L.Ed.2d 366. 
It is unconscionable and contrary to public policy and 
the established law of the land to punish a man for the commis-
sion of an offense which he never would have been guilty of if 
the officers had not inspired, incited, persuaded and lured him 
to attempt to commit, Butt v. U.S *, 273 F. 35. Public policy 
and the law preclude judicial approval of impermissible govern-
ment conduct, People v. D'Angelo, 2 57 NW2d 65. The fundamental 
rule of public policy is that the courts must be closed to the 
trial of crime instigated by the government's own agents. 
Sorrells, supra. The rule of fairness bars a conviction as a 
result of any improper police conduct contrary to public policy, 
Hampton v. U.S., 4 8 L.Ed.2d 113. 
I n
 Banks v. U.S., 249 F.2d 672, the court held that a 
claim of entrapment, if valid, would establish a violation of 
the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. The 4th and 5th 
Amendments establish independent limitations on police conduct, 
the breach of any one by the government, gives rise to a valid 
entrapment defense. It may be suggested in Johnson v. U.S., 
333 US 10, that the 4th Amendment would suggest that a valid 
search warrant be procurred prior to the officers going to 
entrap the defendant. The 4th Amendment is designed to prevent, 
not simply to redress, unlawful police action, Steagald v. U.S., 
68 L.Ed.2d 38. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 5th 
Amendment rights against self-incrimination, Togue v. La., 6 2 
L.Ed.2d 622. 4th Amendment Addendum 7. 5th Amendment Addendum 
9. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION TO ARREST JUDG-
MENT AND SET ASIDE THE THREE CONVICTIONS AND 
ENTER JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, AND IN SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT BASED UPON ILLEGAL AND TAINTED EVI-
DENCE 
The trial court erred in denying defendant's (1) Motion 
to Suppress (R 16), (2) Motion to Dismiss (R 19), (3) Motion 
for a Directed Verdict (R 517), (4) Motion to Arrest Judgment 
and Set Aside the Three Convictions and enter Judgment of 
Acquittal (R 197-206), and (5) in Sentencing defendant (R 210) 
based upon illegal and totally tainted evidence. 
Constitutional wrongs involve both the initial police 
misconduct and any validation of such misconduct by a court 
which accepts illegally seized evidence, MapjD, infra. Govern-
ment's interest cannot be confined to the stage of punishment 
and ignored at the stage of violation, Olmstead v. U.S., 277 
US 438. Any state misconduct is sufficient to invoke the Con-
stitution, Mapp, infra. 
The trial court erred in failing to 
exclude and suppress the tainted 
electronic surveillance evidence at 
the Evidentiary Hearing. 
The officers and the state attorneys did not apply to 
a Utah State District Court Judge for an Order authorizing or 
approving the interception of wire or oral communications be-
tween Dr. Erickson and Officer Paquette. 
All conversations (and illegal transactions) between 
Officer Paquette and Dr. Erickson should have been excluded, 
Section 77-23a-7, Addendum 5, suppressed and the charges dis-
missed. Section 77-23a-2, Addendum 10. 
Dr. Erickson knowingly consented to conversations with 
Kris Gordon, but not with Officer Paquette. When he asked Kri 
Gordon if she was a "plant," she said no, (R 310; 391; 540; 54 
It was required during these dialogues for Officer Paquette to 
give Dr. Erickson a Miranda warning, (5th Amendment.) The 
privilege against self-incrimination "serves to protect the 
innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circum-
stances," Garrity v. N.J., 385 US 493. 
While Kris Gordon was wired-taped with a transmitter 
on her person at the Dental Office, the conversations were 
being monitored outside by other officers and they knew that 
their intent, purpose and design was to try to bait Dr. Erick-
son to violate the law by selling Kris Gordon illegal controlled 
substances. Therefore, the transactions and all of the conver-
sations, with the tapes, wires, recordings, transmissions and 
monitoring that were had between Dr. Erickson and Officer Paquette 
should have been excluded by law, Section 77-23a-7, Addendum 5. 
Katz v. U.S., 19 L.Ed.2d 576, ruled that electronic 
eavesdropping complies with the standard of the 4th Amendment 
only when authorized by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of 
probable cause and under precise limits and appropriate safe-
guards, and that the fruits of such surveillance conducted with-
out such judicial authorization are inadmissible in evidence at 
trial. 
"It is now well settled that the 4th Amendments right 
of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States 
through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 US 643." * * * "The security of one's privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the 
4th Amendment—is basic to a free society," * * * Berger v. 
N.Y., 18 L.Ed.2d 1040, at 1049. * * * "The basic purpose of 
this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this 
court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,11 * * * 
p. 1049. * * * The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred 
from trial physical, tangible material obtained either during 
or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.11 * * * p. 1048. 
Here, as in Berger, at p. 1048, * * * "the eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration 
into the premises occupied by the petitioners." * * * 14th 
Amendment Addendum 11. 
Unreasonable search and seizure 
(no warrants) 
The Officers testified that they had an informant. 
(R 285; 430-32) Therefore, they had probable cause to have a 
search warrant issued. The Officers at no time had arrest or 
search warrants. "We conclude that at the moment Knight in-
formed the police officers where the marijuana was growing, 
they had probable cause to have a search warrant issued." * * * 
State v. Harris (Utah 1983) 671 P.2d 175, at 180, and * * * 
"The presence of a search warrant serves a high function and we 
shall not dispense of it as a mere formality." The conviction 
was reversed, therefore, the officers1 actions must have been 
* * * "fatally pretextual" * * *, p. 180. 
The 4th Amendment and the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14, both mandate against "unreasonable search and seizure." 
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there 
can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them," 
Miranda v. Ariz., 86 S.Ct. 1602. * * * "The 4th Amendment pro-
tects people, not places" * * * Katz, supra, p. 582. The 4th 
Amendment requires courts to exclude not only that which was 
illegally seized, but generally any other evidence (verbal or 
tangible) which was the direct or indirect result of an illegal 
search, seizure or arrest. All evidence "come at by the exploi-
tation of illegality" may not be used against defendant, Wong 
Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471; Mapp, supra. 
The government has the burden or proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that its evidence was and is free from taint, 
U.S. v. Wade, 388 US 218. Anything tainted which might furnish 
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute is enough to 
be suppressed. Derivative evidence should all be suppressed, 
Nardone v. U.S., 308 US 338. Any misleading of the defendant by 
the officers is fatal to the evidence to be used. Bumper v. N.C., 
391 US 543. Officer Paquettefs only mission and purpose was to 
mislead Dr. Erickson with her manufactured plan to bait him into 
committing a crime, which he did when overwhelmed by her tempta-
tion—money, a tool of the flaming, fiery furnaces of hell when 
needed and desired, but not possessed. 
Pressure, which the officers applied against defendant 
is condemned, U.S. v. Hernadez, 574 F.2d 1362. The privilege 
against self-incrimination extends not only to testimony, but 
also to evidence which would furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence necessary to prosecute, Boyd v. U.S . , 116 US 616; 
Weeks v. U.S., 232 US 383. Officer Paquettefs intention (R 378) 
was to make a case to buy drugs from Dr. Erickson. (R 381) 
If any evidence offered in fact confirms that law en-
forcement officers acted improperly, this, without more, justi-
fies an Order of Suppression, Sullins v. U.S., (10th C.A.), 
389 F.2d 985. * * * "An individual in a business office, in a 
friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone 
booth may rely on the protection of the 4th Amendment," * * * 
Katz, supra, p. 582. Fruits of illegal evidence are excluded, 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 US 38 5. Because the 4th 
Amendment affords protection against the uninvited ear, oral 
arguments if illegally overheard, and their illegal fruits are 
all subject to suppression, Silverman v. U.S., 363 US 505. Mapp, 
supra, following Boyd, supra, held that the 4th Amendment, 
(against unreasonable searches and seizures) implemented by the 
self-incriminating clause of the 5th Amendment, forbids the 
government to convict a man of a crime by using testimony or 
papers obtained from him by unreasonable searches and seizures 
as defined in the 4th Amendment. 
From the beginning with (1) the informant, (2) the 
officers planning to trap Dr. Erickson, (3) Officer Paquettefs 
telephone call to defendant's Office on May 23, (4) her (Kris 
Gordonfs) visit to his Office on May 24, and (5) without a 
Warrant or Court Order for electronic surveillance, totally 
tainted the evidence that should have been suppressed-excluded 
with the charges dismissed. 
Defendant was convicted and sentenced based upon 
illegal and totally tainted evidence. 
There were no_ exigent circumstances and no^ hot pursuit 
at any time in this case and action. 
Ark, v. Sanders, 61 L.Ed.2d 235, held the warrantless 
search of the suitcase to be invalid. The court reasoned that 
there were n£ exigent circumstances and that the police must 
have first obtained a warrant before searching the suitcase. 
Also, see U.S. v. Chadwick, 4 33 US 1; State v. Markum, 601 P.2d 
975; State v. Downes, 591 P.2d 1352; State v. Groda, 591 P.2d 
1354. Since the police knew of the automobile and planned all 
along to seize it, there were no exigent circumstances justi-
fying their failure to obtain a valid warrant and the fruits of 
the unconstitutional seizure of the automobile were inadmissible. 
Coolidge v. N.H., 29 L.Ed.2d 564. The motion to suppress should 
have been granted in U.S. v. Dart, 74 7 F.2d 263, because the 
officers could not lift the blanket without a warrant. There 
being no hot pursuit, a search warrant is required (1) to open 
the suitcase, Sanders, supra, and (2) to lift the blanket, Dart, 
supra, therefore, (3) a search warrant is required to open the 
bottle of pills and (4) to open the pills for testing in this 
case. 
After the arrest, the Officers had possession and control 
of the controlled substances, which were tested and testified 
to. (R 499) The Officers had no warrant for testing. The 
officers needed a search warrant for the testing. State v. 
Lowry (Ore. 1983), 667 P.2d 996; State v. Westlund (Ore. 1985), 
705 P.2d 208. The testing and testimony thereon is tainted and 
should have been suppressed. 
Defendant's motion to arrest judgment should have been 
granted (R 197-206) as the denial was another error in law. 
The army of armed officers, 8 to 10, (R 4 76) at the 
Dental Office on June 3, 1985, about 6:00 p.m., just prior to 
the arrest, automatically deprived Dr. Erickson of his freedom 
and liberty in a significant way as there was no escape for him. 
The officers knew the controlled substances were in the Office. 
They had ample time to get a warrant. There were no warrants. 
There were no Mirandas prior to the transaction of the control-
led substances. All conversations, and the transactions, and 
the testing, should have been suppressed and excluded with the 
charges dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) should be reversed 
and this case remanded with instructions to find defendant not 
guilty. Soroushirn, supra. At least, exclude all tainted evi-
dence and dismiss all charges. 
DATED February 18, 1986. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
QyM^h , U/vv{£^4/V*^^ 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) to distribute for value or possess with intent to distribute for value a con-
trolled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) to possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as a sales 
representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances enumerated in Sched-
ules II through V except pursuant to an order or prescription; 
(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to have a controlled substance distributed or 
dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, or negotiate the distribution or dis-
pensing of any other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of the specific controlled 
substance so offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (1) (a) [oi tfeie section] with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedules I or II [whkh is a narcotic drag] is, upon 
conviction, [shall fee sentenced to a term of impriaonmcnt for sot more tfea» fifteen 
years or pay a fine of not more tfea» $15,000, or both.] guilty of a second degree 
felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of any provision of Subsection 
(1) (a) is guilty of a first degree felony, 
ftti)—Any other controlled substance classified » schedules h H? or Hfe except 
marihuana, sfeaB; ttpon conviction; fee sentenced to a term of imprisonment for -not 
mure u ian ten yvixrv tir pay a l ine ur i ivi rxiurt? Liiuxi ipjLu,vvnj, tnr UULAISJ 
Kffi)] £u) ^ substance classified in Schedule III and IV, or marihuana [efeaii] ]§, 
upon conviction, [fee sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more £&& five 
years or pay a fine of net more than $5,0Qty or feotfer] guilty of a third degree felony, 
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ADDENDUM 1 
76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that the actor waa en-
trapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law en-
f orcement officer or a person directed by or acting in co-operation with the 
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit i t 
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or 
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the 
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a 
person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even tbough the 
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evi-
dence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether 
the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion 
shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause 
shown may permit a, later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it 
shall dismiss the ease with prejudice, but if the court determines the de-
fendant was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant 
to the jury at triaL Any order by the court dismissing a case based on en-
trapment shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any bearing before a judge or jury where the defense of en-
trapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted 
except that in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his 
past convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at 
a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial. 
T. L. "TED" CANNON 
S a l t Lake C o u n t y A t t o r n e y 
DAVID S . V7ALSH 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 3 63-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
VERD J. ERICKSEN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
ON MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS & 
TO DISMISS 
Criminal No* CR 85-763 
Judge Scott Daniels 
The above-entrtled case came on regularly for hearing 
on August 27, 1985 upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress all 
physical evidence seized in the course of the investigation, 
a]so to suppress all statements elicited from the defendant, 
and to dismiss the case on the defense of entrapment. The 
plaintiff being represented by David S. Walsh, Deputy County 
Attorneyf and the defendant being present land represented by 
his attorney Walker Anderson, and the Court having taken 
evidence and heard argument by counsel concerning their 
respective positions and being fully advised in the premises 
ADDENDUM 3 na<re 1 
Findings & Conclusions 
Case CR R5-763 
Page 2 
hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS 
1. The electronic surveillance in this case was 
not a "search" and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
See Hoffa v» United States, 385 D.S. 293 (1966). Any conver-
sations had between the defendant and Ms. Paquette are not 
excludable. Any of the drugs seized or taken are not 
suppressed. 
2. The State failed to carry its burden to show 
consent for the search or that the search was within the 
limits of a search pursuant to an arrest. Accordingly, the 
office files will be surpressed. 
3. The State failed to carry its burden of proof 
to show that any statements made after the arrest were made 
voluntarily and after waiver of right to remain silent. 
Therefore, any statement made by Dr. Ericksen in response to 
a question will be surpressed. 
4. The conduct of the officer, objectively viewed, 
does not rise to the level of entrapment• The Court finds 
that the police merely provided the defendant with an 
opportunity to commit an offense* They did not induce the 
ADDENDUM 3 page 2 
Findings & Conclusions 
Case CR 85-763 
Page 3 
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence for 
purposes of a prosecution of one who was not otherwise ready 
to commit it. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Any evidence taken, received by officer Paquette 
is not suppressed and is admissible as against the defendant. 
2. The files or other documents seized by the 
police or their agents after the arrest of the defendant is 
suppressed. 
3. The statements of the defendant to the police 
after the arrest, if given in response to the questions of 
the police are suppressed. 
4. As a matter of law# the defendant was not 
entrapped and the case will not be dismissed on that basis. 
»d this / o Datec day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
Judge SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
Attorney for the Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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^1 *prm Reporter , Bailiff T^Pr^u^ 
2£xSL 
D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by B^Sjury; D the court; • plea of guilty; 
D plea of p£contest; of the offense of (l/n(mMo < i>^4 - JpV (?flf/M> Qm Cfini- - f W . A a felony 
of the x2-r^fegree, D a class misdemeanor, being now presenjin court apd ready for sentence and 
represented hy/jt? . frJflbfteflT-^ and the State being represented h y f i i K ^ C ^ - ^ t 2 i t < n n w adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Pris 
D to a maximum mandatory term of. 
D npt to exceed five years; 
years and which may be for life; 
roi not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
•D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
are hereby dismissed. 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
fr*Defendant is granted a stay of the above (CTprison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this. ^ B ^ W ""V 'day of 












CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
e^ jJsua l and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
S>"i3erve / * ? ^ ^ ^ 3 i ft , n t h e S a l t L a k e County Jail 
commencing T O t Y $ g ? 7 I f\ £>«££•> CtW* 
D Pay a fine in the amount of $ C at a rate to be determined by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole; or • at a rate of 
Br Pay restitution in the amount of S G O * &Q \\ , or • in an amount to be determined by. ^t 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. ^  U)(^^ h 3 0 ^ ^ 2 ^ 9 ^ P ^ ^ ^ ^ L 
D Enter, participate in, and complete any prog ram, xoun^efmg, 
or treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
^ m Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
S^^fcrbmit to drug testing. 
Sj/lMot associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or 
drags. 
QrHzX frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
E^No t use or possess non-prescnbed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
• Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
• Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
• Participate in and complete any • educational, and/or Q vocational training D as directed by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, or with D 
• Participate in and complete any training. 
D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, or with 
• 
• Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with . 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate 
Compact as approved by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
©^Complete hours of community service as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service in lieu of days in jail. 
D Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
• Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review 





day of / ^ U \ DATED this «^<=^  f 
ATTcST )URTJUDGE 
4H. W * O N H w O L f T 
ADDENDUM 4 p a g e 2 / a**f P a 9 e o f 
77-23a-7. Evidence — Exclusionary rule. Whenever any wire or orai 
communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the commu-
nication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence 
in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand 
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or 
other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof, if the disclo-
sure of that information would be in violation of this chapter. 
History: C 1953, T7-23a-7, enacted by L Collateral References. 
1980, eh. 15, § 2. 22A CJS Criminal Law § 657(24). 
29 AmJur 2d 489, Evidence § 433. 
77-23a-& Order authorizing or approving interception* The attorney 
general of the State of Utah, or any assistant attorney general specially 
designated by the attorney general or any county attorney or any deputy 
county attorney specially designated by the county attorney, may authorize 
an application to a Utah State district court judge of competent jurisdic-
tion for, and the judge may grant in conformity with the procedures for 
interception of wire or oral communications by any law enforcement 
agency of this state or any political subdivisions having responsibility for 
the investigation of the type of offense regarding which the application is 
made, an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral 
communication by any law enforcement agency of this state or any politi-
cal subdivision having responsibility for investigation of the offense as to 
which the application is made, when the interception sought may provide 
or has provided evidence of: 
(1) Any crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one 
year in the Utah state prison; 
(2) A violation of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, chapter 37, title 
58; or 
(3) Any conspiracy to commit any of the crimes named in this section. 
ADDENDUMS 5 and 6 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
ADDENDUM 7 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I, § 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
ADDENDUM 8 
AM^JNumjturtx v 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 'infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shaU any person 
be subject for the same onence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
ADDENDUM 9 
77-23a-2. Legislative findings. The legislature finds and determines 
tha t 
(1) Wire communications are normally conducted through facilities 
which form part of an interstate network. The same facilities are used for 
interstate and intrastate communications. 
(2) In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communi-
cations, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, 
and to prevent the obstruction of intrastate commerce, it is necessary for 
the legislature to define the circumstances and conditions under which the 
interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized and to 
prohibit any unauthorized interception of these communications and the 
use of the contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative pro-
ceedings. 
(3) Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral communi-
cations in their criminal activities. The interception of such communica-
tions to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to present their 
commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administra-
tion of justice. 
(4) To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of 
wire or oral communications when none of the parties to the communica-
tion has consented to the interception should be allowed only when autho-
rized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the 
control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception of wire and 
oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of 
offenses and specific categories of crime with assurance that the intercep-





All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
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